Introduction
The contemporary West had never experienced an atmosphere so gloomy, and wreathed from pain deeper than that which characterized the September 11 2001 attacks in the United States. Not only were the momentous devastations aired for a horrified global group of viewers, but the fact that they hit both New York and Washington (Globalization capitals) justifies the sheer horror and disbelief with which Americans and the world watched the unfolding of the 9/11 attacks. The aftermath almost brought America to a standstill as thousands of people from across the world (approximately 26 countries) perished during, and as a result of the attack. For the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis in the year 1962, terrorism had seeped right into the American borders and created unfathomable fear among the population who now felt their homeland greatly threatened. The events compounded into internal cries for help and external or global calls for the American leadership to ‘do something about it’ (Zaborowski, 2006, p. 102). In responding to the pressure, the Bush’s administration embarked on rigorous foreign policy ratification, the focus on terrorism, for instance, shifted. Kellner (2003, p. 39), and others, hold the view that the occurrence significantly changed America’s foreign policy and the associated spheres of politics. Other commentators like Gaddis (2005), McCartney (2004) and Hirsch (2002) all contend that 9/11 triggered notable changes in the American foreign policy bringing not only a string of alterations to its focus but also foreign policy conduct and approach mechanisms. Even so, other scholars posit that nothing happened, but if any did, it was somewhat insignificant and unfelt by Americans and the world (Leffler, 2003 and Kennedy-Pipe & Rengger, 2006). The only thing that changed according to the latter lot, was the perception of Americans who generally felt that something had indeed changed. The following discussion draws from the controversy (critically examines both standpoints), but notes that the changes in foreign policy by the Bush administration after the 9/11 were inarguably significant, at least in the short-run.
Background of American Foreign Policy Before 9/11
The following section provides a historical underpinning of the American foreign policy during the Clinton and George Bush’s administration before the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and the United Airlines Flight 93 on September the eleventh. Any meaningful analysis of the purported changes must draw from the nature and features of foreign policies before the eventful day. According to Porter (2009), the twilight of the Cold War shifted the central position from which the US had always focused its foreign policy. Decades on end, the USSR furnished America with a renowned military and ideological adversary which facilitated the formulation, drafting, and final writing of the Grand Strategy narrative. The events were enveloped by ‘Containment’, a term that Presidents between Truman and Reagan adopted extensively (Porter, 2009, p. 286). The author also notes that Clinton’s foreign policy always forwarded a narrative that America comprises blessed and favored citizens of a country with no external threats (Porter, 2009, p. 3). Despite President Clinton’s policy riding on an optimist’s perspective, Kellner (2003) notes that the apparent lack of definition of external threats rendered the foreign policy ‘ad hoc’ and somewhat reactive. It specified no clear strategies or directions for pre-empting and dealing with real external threats. In summation, Clinton’s doctrine was incoherent.
However, this view of the Clinton’s administration foreign policy is largely contested. Brinkley (1997) expounds that manner in which the government adopted the concept of ‘Enlargement’ which would entail the driving rhetoric behind the foreign policy agenda of the administration. The notion comprised two major foreign policy goals that not only undergirded its operationality but also validated its very existence. The two goals included elevation of the role of economics in foreign policy and promotion of democracy overseas. Apparently, it is arguably that this administration operated on a policy that was less singular compared to the previous administrations. Even then, Brinkley (1997) counterintuitively posit that the absence of a grand narrative was understandable if not witty. In particular, by failing to ideological constrain his administration, President Clinton gave his government the requisite flexibility and tenacity to tackle the unfolding new world order realities.