A Theory of Justice springs from one John Rawls’ most prolific works of ethics and political philosophy. In the work, he attempts at solving the puzzle surrounding distributive justice through the utilisation of a different version of the familiar instrument of the social contract (Wenar 2008; Cohen n.d; Phelps 2013, p. 319-362). In this case, distributive justice comprises a manner of distribution of goods in a particular society that is just and considers the needs of everyone in equal measure (Garret 2011). From his work came the theory of ‘Justice and Fairness’, which operates, based on two major principles of justice which include the principle of liberty and the principle of equality (Freeman 2007, p. 3). Precisely, Rawls champions for a principled harmonisation of equality and liberty that would integrate even into the most basic structures of well-organised societies (Rawls 2005, p.1). It is noteworthy that the premises of the arguments in the Theory of Justice are not solely Rawls’, but are informed by those of David Hume and Immanuel Kant from whom Rawls borrow vital views. The two principles are not only meant to steer the society through the achievement of justice but also guide parties and the conducts of their members. The parties are considered to comprise ends they seek to vouch for through mutual cooperation with other parties. In this respect, John Rawls proffers a framework that leads to a fair choice situation, which acts as a ground from which the parties would theoretically pick justice principles that are mutually acceptable in their standpoints. The framework expatiates the concept of ‘Original Position’ accompanied by the idea of the ‘veil of ignorance.’ Arguably, John Rawls’ principles of justice are not only useful but also attractive and superior over others such as utilitarian accounts concerning these specific party constraints.
The ‘Original Position’
A profound comprehension of the two principles named above requires a requisite understanding of the concept of the ‘original position.’ In fact, the two principles of justice are products of the ‘Original position.’ The ‘Original position,’ thus, is an artificial device used in the development of these popular principles of justice (Freeman 2009; Bloom 1991, p. 315-331). In the ‘Original position,’ everyone has their mode of uninformed means of deciding their principles of justice. Such principles are products of a person’s thoughts and are marred by their cognitive biases and personal prejudices. Since such principles stem from the raw thoughts of a person, John Rawls refers to the state as a ‘veil of ignorance.’ Indeed, the veil obscures people’s vision to all the personal facts to the extent that they fail to design these principles of justice to suit their situations. According to Rawls (2005, p. 7-9), no one is cognizant of the rightful place in the society or community including their social position and status. Besides, no one is well averse with information concerning his or her strength, abilities, and their share of the natural assets. Since the parties are composed of ‘ignorant’ members, they are probably unaware of their specific perspectives of the good. It is from such a standpoint of ignorance (veil of ignorance) that the principles of justice spring. However, this is advantageous as such ignorance of the most pertinent details about oneself leads to the formulation of principles of justice that are fair to everyone (Rawls, 1999, p. 11). Suppose an individual is completely uncertain of their fate in the society, they are highly likely to treat everyone with fairness despite their social classes. On the overall, at the ‘Original position,’ people would subconsciously adopt a strategy that favours everyone in the society especially the less wealthy or the poor.
The ‘Original Position’ borrows from the ‘thin theory of the good’, which according to him expatiates the rationality that undergirds the choice and formulation of the principles behind the veil of ignorance in the ‘Original position.’ A complete theory of the good follows as soon as the derivation of the principles from the original position is complete. Correspondingly, from the original position, parties would adopt two of those principles aimed at assigning of duties and rights as well as governing the allocation of both economic and societal advantages throughout the society (Gerald & Shane 2011. Essentially, an agreement drawn from the original position has two sides: historical and hypothetical. Its hypothetical side comes from the fact that the principles that would be derived are what the parties would adopt under particular permitting conditions, rather than what they have already endorsed. Argumentatively, the principles of justice are the same elements that people would endorse in the ‘Original position.’ Thus, the principles carry a moral obligation. On a different note, the agreement is ahistorical since there is no projection of a prior existence of the agreement whatsoever that could have stemmed from the real world independent of the carefully controlled experimental activities.