A Theory of Justice springs from one John Rawls’ most prolific works of ethics and political philosophy. In the work, he attempts at solving the puzzle surrounding distributive justice through the utilisation of a different version of the familiar instrument of the social contract (Wenar 2008; Cohen n.d; Phelps 2013, p. 319-362). In this case, distributive justice comprises a manner of distribution of goods in a particular society that is just and considers the needs of everyone in equal measure (Garret 2011). From his work came the theory of ‘Justice and Fairness’, which operates, based on two major principles of justice which include the principle of liberty and the principle of equality (Freeman 2007, p. 3). Precisely, Rawls champions for a principled harmonisation of equality and liberty that would integrate even into the most basic structures of well-organised societies (Rawls 2005, p.1). It is noteworthy that the premises of the arguments in the Theory of Justice are not solely Rawls’, but are informed by those of David Hume and Immanuel Kant from whom Rawls borrow vital views. The two principles are not only meant to steer the society through the achievement of justice but also guide parties and the conducts of their members. The parties are considered to comprise ends they seek to vouch for through mutual cooperation with other parties. In this respect, John Rawls proffers a framework that leads to a fair choice situation, which acts as a ground from which the parties would theoretically pick justice principles that are mutually acceptable in their standpoints. The framework expatiates the concept of ‘Original Position’ accompanied by the idea of the ‘veil of ignorance.’ Arguably, John Rawls’ principles of justice are not only useful but also attractive and superior over others such as utilitarian accounts concerning these specific party constraints.
The ‘Original Position’
A profound comprehension of the two principles named above requires a requisite understanding of the concept of the ‘original position.’ In fact, the two principles of justice are products of the ‘Original position.’ The ‘Original position,’ thus, is an artificial device used in the development of these popular principles of justice (Freeman 2009; Bloom 1991, p. 315-331). In the ‘Original position,’ everyone has their mode of uninformed means of deciding their principles of justice. Such principles are products of a person’s thoughts and are marred by their cognitive biases and personal prejudices. Since such principles stem from the raw thoughts of a person, John Rawls refers to the state as a ‘veil of ignorance.’ Indeed, the veil obscures people’s vision to all the personal facts to the extent that they fail to design these principles of justice to suit their situations. According to Rawls (2005, p. 7-9), no one is cognizant of the rightful place in the society or community including their social position and status. Besides, no one is well averse with information concerning his or her strength, abilities, and their share of the natural assets. Since the parties are composed of ‘ignorant’ members, they are probably unaware of their specific perspectives of the good. It is from such a standpoint of ignorance (veil of ignorance) that the principles of justice spring. However, this is advantageous as such ignorance of the most pertinent details about oneself leads to the formulation of principles of justice that are fair to everyone (Rawls, 1999, p. 11). Suppose an individual is completely uncertain of their fate in the society, they are highly likely to treat everyone with fairness despite their social classes. On the overall, at the ‘Original position,’ people would subconsciously adopt a strategy that favours everyone in the society especially the less wealthy or the poor.
The ‘Original Position’ borrows from the ‘thin theory of the good’, which according to him expatiates the rationality that undergirds the choice and formulation of the principles behind the veil of ignorance in the ‘Original position.’ A complete theory of the good follows as soon as the derivation of the principles from the original position is complete. Correspondingly, from the original position, parties would adopt two of those principles aimed at assigning of duties and rights as well as governing the allocation of both economic and societal advantages throughout the society (Gerald & Shane 2011. Essentially, an agreement drawn from the original position has two sides: historical and hypothetical. Its hypothetical side comes from the fact that the principles that would be derived are what the parties would adopt under particular permitting conditions, rather than what they have already endorsed. Argumentatively, the principles of justice are the same elements that people would endorse in the ‘Original position.’ Thus, the principles carry a moral obligation. On a different note, the agreement is ahistorical since there is no projection of a prior existence of the agreement whatsoever that could have stemmed from the real world independent of the carefully controlled experimental activities.
The Two Principles of Justice
As already stated, Rawls’ justice principles include the liberty and the equality principle. These principles are ordered in a lexical manner with Rawls emphasis on the priority that liberty holds.
The First Principle of Justice
The first principle of justice is the liberty principle. According to Rawls (1999, p. 53), everyone should have equal rights to the ‘most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.’ From the assertion, it is notable that the first principle is egalitarian in the sense that it insists on equal and unbiased allocation of the extensive liberties to everyone in the society. In the real world, the basic liberties of citizens include the political right and liberty to not only vote but also vie for a political position, freedom of assembly and speech, the freedom of individual property, the right to autonomy, and the right to protection from arbitrary arrest (Andreas 2005, p. 88). The first principle vouches for the equal distribution of all of these rights and liberties across the society. Even so, there are reservations as to whether the freedom of contract should be part of these most basic personal needs. The freedom of contract encompasses the freedom proffered to the public individuals or private groups to initiate and establish contracts without the intervention of the government. It underpins the laissez-faire economics and forms the basis for the free-market libertarianism. The freedom provides the interested parties with the liberty to choose who to contract and which contract terms to accept. It is argued that the freedom of contract is not a basic freedom, thus, should not form part of the provisions of the first principle of justice (Rawls 1999, p.54). A basic liberty, in this context, is an inalienable and one of the most fundamental liberties of a person. No government or authority can amend or remove the basic liberties from the individuals. However, while the freedom of contract should be free of government interference, the government can revoke such contracts if they are deemed to threaten the existence of the citizen or infringes on the most basic rights of the people (Falaky 2014, p. 66). It is the fact that the freedom of contract is removable under extreme conditions that disqualifies it from being a basic liberty.
The Second Principle of Justice
The second principle of justice is the equality principle. According to Rawls (1999, p.53), the economic and social inequalities should be arranged in a manner that (a) they offer the greatest of benefits to the less advantaged people in the society, (b) they are connected to offices and positions being open to everyone. The first assertion is known as the difference principle while the second one forms the basis of the fair and equality principle. Essentially, the difference principle is meant to regulate the available inequalities. The fact that Rawls guarantees the poor members of the society a fair deal gives an impression that he is taking care of the natural inequalities such as the inborn talents such as a personal capacity for sport. The first claim is particularly egalitarian in the sense that it leaves room for the provision that the inequalities are allowed to exist in as far as they favour the less fortunate members of the society. However, this is particularly ambiguous as it gives rise to an insinuation that cannot be assumed. Accordingly, it insinuates that the societal inequalities are perfectly normal occurrences that are just as long as they are of use to the less advantaged members of the society. The argument for this position draws largely from the theory that, factors that are morally arbitrary such as family, should never influence the life chances of a person or their life opportunities (Wolff 1977, p. 3-212). This position is controversial in the sense that in a real life society, such morally arbitrary factors have a significant influence on a person’s life opportunities and chances. Even then, Rawls opines that an individual does not morally require their natural talents, thus, a person is not entitled to all the merits that come from their inborn talents. On a larger view, the difference principle stemming from the first assertion is not egalitarian as it makes the merits for the highly talented people in the society proportionate to their societal contributions while entirely benefiting the less privileged members of the society. Therefore, it is both egalitarian and un-egalitarian based on the point of view of the argument.
The second stipulation- fair and equality- is viewed be first in the lexical order between the two assertions. It does not only require that the positions and offices be distributed depending on merit, but everyone has the requisite accessibility to the skills based on the criterion through which the merit is assessed (Okin 1989, p. 9). This section of the second principle maintains that the openness of the positions and offices should be free of any form of prejudice. It is noteworthy that Rawls insinuations do not mean that the distribution of the resources needs to be necessarily equal as per the blueprints of the principles. However, the distributions of the resources must be to the advantage of everyone in equal measures. For instance, no one should be barred from accessing the offices or income generating opportunities on the basis of their sex or ethnicity.
Rawls’ Argument as to why these Principles would be Chosen
The primary challenge for Rawls is showing how and why these principles would be chosen universally given the microcosmic societal differences and ethical issues throughout the world. Rawls (1999, p.54) notes that the two principles are unique to their contents and their acceptance and choosing depends on particular assumptions that require profound expatiation and justification. Initially, it is worth observing that the two principles of justice form a special case of a relatively wide perspective of justice that could be expanded in a succeeding manner (Sandel 1998, p.14). Firstly, all the social values such as income and wealth, opportunities, and liberty are inherently meant to be distributed in a manner that would favour everyone in the society equally with an exception that an unequal allotment of any of the social values would work to everyone’s advantage. The latter situation is highly unlikely and somewhat rare. In this respect, Rawls define injustice as an inequality that benefits just a section of the members of the society (Rawls 1999, p.54). Evidently, the definition is somewhat vague and requires profound substantiation. Consider a case where the basic structure of a particular society facilitates the equitable allocation of the particular primary goods. As the immediate needs of every rational person, the goods find application in all the aspects of a person’s life plan. For better understanding, these primary goods are assumed to be the liberties, income and wealth, rights and opportunities in the society. Thus, these become the social primary goods. On the other hand, the natural goods include intelligence, health, vigour, and imagination. They are considered natural goods in the sense that whereas their possession depends on the society’s basic structure, the structure does not directly control the goods (Sen 2009). Then, consider a hypothetical case of a societal arrangement that ensures the equal distribution of all the social primary goods with everyone having such as duties and rights, and enjoy even sharing of the wealth and income. Such a state of affairs lays a foundation for benchmarking societal improvements. Suppose particular inequalities, especially of wealth and authority gaps, would enable a situation where every member of the society is well off compared to the preceding theoretical situation, then the people will accord with, accept, and choose the general conception of the principles.
Evidently, in a theoretical perspective still, by letting go of some of the most basic liberties, the ultimate economic and social gains would sufficiently compensate for the resultant void in the individuals. The worldview of justices is unrestrictive and unspecific about the type of inequalities that fits the bill. However, it champions for the improvement of every individual’s position within the society. Consider a case where people are willing to relinquish particular political rights at the promise of significant economic returns. The two principles of justice directly rule out such kind of exchange. Since the principles are ordered vis-à-vis the serial order, the fail to allow an exchange occurring between the economic and social gains and the basic liberties save for a case of extenuating circumstances. Following this line of thought, an explanation of the argument as to why these principles may be chosen ought to abandon the general conception of justice for an in-depth examination of the serial order of the two principles of justice. According to Rawls (1999, p.55), this is particularly advantageous as it takes care of the priorities and makes substantive efforts to find the principles that deal with the matter of priorities. Such an explanation also reveals the superiority of these two principles of justice, which is the primary reason why they would be chosen among other similar accounts. One delves deep into the conditions that would define the absolute priority of liberty vis-à-vis economic and social advantages in a bid to examine the feasibility of each of the justifications. In a superficial view, such ranking looks too skewed and extreme to yield any significant results. However, a critical analysis of the same reveals that there is a substantive justification for that case whose discovery would not be possible through skin-deep evaluation. Besides, the difference between the basic liberties and rights and social and economic benefits marks a uniqueness that exists among the primary social goods, which reveal a pivotal division within the social system. Even so, it is critical to point out that the proposed ordering and the distinctions only serve as approximations whose major aim is to inform the discussion rather than be taken as the whole truth. In other circumstances, they would fail, thus, their usage also depends on the particular circumstance and context. Everything said, in serial order, the two principles would serve better than other similar principles. Undoubtedly, this is another reason why these principles would be chosen.
Thirdly, Rawls (1999, p.55) application of two principles to an institution has particular consequences. In this case, in comparison to similar accounts such as utilitarianism, these two principles of justice would be chosen due to their minimal application shortcomings. Ideally, the basic liberties and rights emphasised by these principles comprise those that form part of the public rules of the society’s fundamental structure. The freedom of an individual depends on duties and rights as defined by the established societal institutions (Nussbaum 2006). In connection, the first principle mandates that set of societal rules be applicable to everyone in equal measure. The primary reason for reducing the extensiveness of the liberties is the fact that they hinder a seamless operation of each other. Furthermore, when such principles implicate person or mandate that everyone equally benefits from the societal inequalities, those implicated are the individuals holding the specific societal positions that are products of the basic structure of the society. Therefore, in the application of the second principle, it has been assumed that the representative individuals could be assigned such expectations as the societal well-being. The expectation is an indicator of the life prospects of the representative persons in the standpoint of their social station. In reality, a representative person’s expectations are functions of the allocation of the duties and rights in accordance with the basic structure of the society. Therefore, as the second principle applies to institutional forms, it denotes the expectations of the representatives. Notably, none of the principles defines the distribution of specific goods to specific people (Robert 1993, p. 183-231).
In conclusion, while these principles have some inherent drawbacks concerning their applications, their tenets are largely proven and applicable in most circumstances making them popular over other similar accounts. Thus, the essay has proven that John Rawls’ principles of justice are not only useful but also attractive and superior over others such as utilitarian accounts concerning these specific party constraints. The principles vouch for equality in the society without obscuring the rights of any member of the society. While the road to societal equality may be long, application of these principles will draw a society closer to the achievement of such an endeavour. Concisely, how the principles would be chosen largely bases on the earlier explained concepts of the ‘Original position,’ and the accompanying notion of ‘veil of ignorance.